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ARTICLE
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND
NORMATIVE BUSINESS ETHICS
PHILIPP SCHRECK*
I. BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
Corruption, child labor, lying, and cheating are all examples of im-
moral business behavior that are subject to scrutiny within the academic
discipline of business ethics. Traditionally, this discipline has examined
what companies should do, making it inherently normative.1 Corresponding
approaches have asked questions such as: How are certain practices within
business to be evaluated? Who is morally responsible for certain business
scandals? Which norms and values should individuals follow when facing
ethical dilemmas in business? How should they behave?
Recently, however, a subdomain of ethics has gained momentum that
asks questions of a fundamentally different kind: Which moral decisions do
individuals actually take? How do they behave? Such questions are being
asked within the field of behavioral business ethics.2 Their proponents’
* Philipp Schreck holds the Friede-Springer Endowed Chair of Business Ethics and Man-
agement Accounting at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenburg in Germany. He earned his
PhD at Ludwig Maximilian University Munich with a thesis on the Business Case for Corporate
Social Responsibility. His research interests are in corporate responsibility, sustainability report-
ing, and behavioral accounting. His articles have appeared in such Journals as Business & Society,
Business Ethics Quarterly, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, and the Journal of Business
Ethics.
1. Compare Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organiza-
tions: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 747–50 (1999) (discussing normative approaches ap-
plied to teams), with NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE (1999), and
THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH
TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999) (discussing social contracts), and ALEJO JOSE G. SISON, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND ETHICS: AN ARISTOTELIAN PERSPECTIVE (2008) (discussing ethics within cor-
porations), and Robert C. Solomon, Business Ethics and Virtue, in A COMPANION TO BUSINESS
ETHICS 30, 30–37 (Robert E. Frederick ed., 2002). See generally ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS
(Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman E. Bowie & Denis G. Arnold eds., 8th ed. 2009).
2. See, e.g., DAVID DE CREMER & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS:
SHAPING OUR EMERGING FIELD (2012); Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kristin Smith-Crowe, Ethical Deci-
sion Making: What We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, in THE ACADEMY OF MGMT. ANNALS,
545, 546–93 (James P. Walsh & Arthur P. Brief eds., 2008); Linda K. Trevin˜o, Gary R. Weaver &
Scott J. Reynolds, Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. OF MGMT. 951, 951–80
(2006); PATRICIA H. WERHANE, LAURA PINCUS HARTMAN, CRINA ARCHER, ELAINE E. ENGLE-
360
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main goal is the description, rather than the evaluation, of behavior: “[W]e
are concerned with describing and predicting what people think, perceive,
and do; generally, we are not in the business of telling people what they
should do.”3
Behavioral business ethics is an interdisciplinary field, which draws on
findings from experimental research in mainly three (partly overlapping)
areas:
• experimental moral psychology,4 or ethical decision making;5
• experimental economics to the extent that it deals with moral issues;
and
• experimental moral philosophy.6
Business ethics and experimental research thus share an interest in
morals as an academic topic. But their proponents often explicitly stress
their respective domain’s differences. As behavioral researcher Adam
Galinsky put it: “Behavioral ethics takes us out of the idealized and stuffy
world of philosophy and teaches us how people really act and why and
when they deviate for their stated ethical norms.”7
Representatives of philosophical ethics, on the other hand, occasion-
ally maintain a certain skepticism towards the field of behavioral business
ethics. This reservation on the side of normative philosophy is closely re-
lated to a distinction between (positive) statements of “is” and (normative)
statements of “ought.” This distinction has been argued to be the reason for
a traditional division of labor between those disciplines primarily concerned
with generating normative statements (“ought”), and those primarily con-
cerned with generating positive statements (“is”):
One reason for philosophical skepticism about the relevance of
empirical moral psychology is a conviction, which is usually
traced to Western intellectual traditions flowing from the Enlight-
enment, of the deep metaphysical and epistemological signifi-
cance of a distinction between facts and norms.8
HARDT & MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD, OBSTACLES TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING: MENTAL MODELS,
MILGRAM AND THE PROBLEM OF OBEDIENCE (2013).
3. Danielle E. Warren & Kristin Smith-Crowe, Deciding What’s Right: The Role of Exter-
nal Sanctions and Embarrassment in Shaping Moral Judgments in the Workplace, 28 RES. ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. 81, 84 (2008).
4. See generally Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experimental Moral Psychology, 138 DAEDALUS
92, 92–102 (2009); see also ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (Hagop Sarkis-
sian & Jennifer Cole Wright eds., 2014).
5. See Jana L. Craft, A Review of the Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature:
2004–2011, 117 J. BUS. ETHICS 221, 221–59 (2013); Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, supra note 2.
6. Compare Mark Alfano & Don Loeb, Experimental Moral Philosophy, STANFORD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ARCHIVE (Mar. 19, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/
entries/experimental-moral/, with JOSHUA ALEXANDER, EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 1–9 (2012) (indicating that this domain is generally considered a part of experimental
philosophy).
7. DE CREMER & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 2.
8. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS 21 (2008).
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Such skepticism reflects a more fundamental and general problem with
a long-standing tradition. The normative discipline of ethics has always had
strong reservations against the notion that the factual may play a role in the
search for the counterfactual. This separation of positive and normative re-
search is rooted in the desire to avoid a well-known error—the so-called
“naturalistic fallacy.”9
To suppose that one can deduce an “ought” from an “is,” or, what
amounts to the same thing, that one can deduce a normative ethi-
cal conclusion from empirical research, is to commit a logical
mistake some dub the “naturalistic fallacy.”10
If it is true that some men do cheat on their wives, this does not imply
that they should do that. If in some market economies, corruption and brib-
ery are widespread, this does not mean they should be. And if in some
developing countries it is common practice that ten-year-old children work
in textile production sites fourteen hours a day, the presence of this situation
does not justify its desirability.11
In light of this strict separation between the realms of positive and
normative science, a yawning epistemological gap exists between norma-
tive business ethics on the one side, and (descriptive) behavioral business
ethics on the other. This gap raises the question whether and to what degree
normative business ethics has anything to learn from behavioral research.
That is the question that this article will address, focusing on the particular
example of experimental economics.12 The main arguments will be devel-
oped in three steps. The first section will provide a short discussion of the
main research aims in business ethics. The following section will character-
ize two distinct strategies through which experimental economists have
sought to theoretically integrate the phenomenon of morality. The final sec-
tion will analyze the contribution that these two strategies could offer to
9. Compare G. E. Moore, The Subject-Matter of Ethics, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN
ETHICS 382, 387–88 (William K. Frankena & John T. Granrose eds., 1974), with Ralph Barton
Perry, R. M. Hare, Carl Wellman, David Hume & P. H. Nowell-Smith, Debate about Naturalism
and Intuitionism, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN ETHICS 394, 394–98 (William K. Frankena &
John T. Granrose eds., 1974), and Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics, Ideology and the
Naturalistic Fallacy, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 227, 227–32 (1985). See Thomas Donaldson, When Inte-
gration Fails: The Logic of Prescription and Description in Business Ethics, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q.
157, 160 (1994) (stating that one cannot deduce “ought” statements from pure “is” statements).
10. Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business
Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 253 (1994), http://
www.jstor.org/stable/258705.
11. See generally Donaldson, supra note 9; Philipp Schreck, Dominik van Aaken & Thomas
Donaldson, Positive Economics and the Normativistic Fallacy: Bridging the Two Sides of CSR, 23
BUS. ETHICS Q. 297, 297–329 (2013) (discussing, in more detail, the relation between positive and
normative statements in business ethics).
12. Although the argumentation is not formally restricted to a particular experimental re-
search approach, I will focus on the special case of experimental economics for the sake of sim-
plicity and clarity.
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business ethics and its respective research aims. A short summary and out-
look will conclude this article.
II. BUSINESS ETHICS AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
A. Justification, Explanation, and Implementation: The Epistemic Goals
of Business Ethics
Business ethics deals with moral problems in business. This occupa-
tion typically refers to behaviors in and of companies that are in conflict
with society’s perceptions of what is morally right and wrong. To analyze
which role experimental economics may play for the purposes of business
ethics, it is useful to distinguish different epistemic goals within this
discipline.
The first is the justification of certain morals: that is, of moral values,
principles, norms, etc. Justifications have always played an important role
within business ethics debates because it requires well-justified normative
arguments to defend ethical judgments such as bribery is illegitimate,13 or
human beings should never be treated “as a means merely,”14 or “business
has obligations to protect the natural environment.”15 Of course, business
ethicists do not necessarily agree on one justification. Consider, for exam-
ple, the ongoing discussion on the ethical evaluation of so-called sweat-
shops.16 While some ethicists argue that sweatshops are a violation of the
most basic human rights and thus ought to be condemned, others maintain
that many workers freely choose to accept the typical sweatshop labor con-
ditions and defend the moral legitimacy of sweatshops.
Regardless of where one stands in this debate, it illustrates that one
purpose of business ethics is to come to well-founded conclusions on
whether a moral issue is ethically justified or not. Put generally, the goal of
justification is to identify what ought to be morally right. It is about the
evaluation of morals; while some moral principles may be justifiable (e.g.,
honesty), others are not (e.g., treating others as pure means towards one’s
own ends). Developing theories and arguments for such justifications has
always been at the heart of ethical inquiry. Approaches to business ethics
have drawn on these theoretical resources and have used diverse ethical
13. Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas Donaldson, Social Contract Approaches to Business Eth-
ics: Bridging the “is-ought” Gap, in A COMPANION TO BUSINESS ETHICS 38, 38–55 (Robert E.
Frederick ed., 2002).
14. Norman E. Bowie, A Kantian Approach to Business Ethics, in A COMPANION TO BUSI-
NESS ETHICS 3, 3–16 (Robert E. Frederick ed., 2002).
15. W. Michael Hoffman, Business and Environmental Ethics, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 169, 169
(1991).
16. See generally Benjamin Powell & Matt Zwolinski, The Ethical and Economic Case
Against Sweatshop Labor: A Critical Assessment, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 449, 449–72 (2011); Matt
Zwolinski, Sweatshops, Choice and Exploitation, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 689, 689–727 (2007).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 5 11-FEB-16 15:18
364 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
theories to come to normative conclusions about moral questions in
business.17
However, business ethics is not restricted to justifying what is ethically
desirable. It also seeks ways to implement it. This second goal of business
ethics can be traced back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which is not
only interested in theoretical knowledge but also in its practical implica-
tions. Correspondingly, concepts of business ethics seek ways to align peo-
ple’s actions in organizations with justified, commonly accepted principles
and norms. As an example, consider the issues of corporate corruption,18
which hit big corporations such as Siemens, or accounting scandals such as
that of Enron, which eventually led to the company’s downfall.19 There, the
problem was not one of ethical justification. Almost everybody will agree
that corruption and the manipulation of income statements are morally (let
alone legally) wrong, but less agreement exists on how to prevent them.
The goal of business ethics beyond mere justification of moral principles—
to develop action-guiding prescriptions on how to actually realize these
principles—can be characterized as the goal of implementation. Implemen-
tation’s aim is to influence behavior—to change business practice in the
direction of an ethical ideal. To prove that corruption is morally wrong is
one thing. To prevent it in practice is a very different one.
Both goals—justification and implementation—lead to the establish-
ment of normative statements, but they rely on different preconditions.
These differences can best be discussed within the formal structure of a
practical syllogism as illustrated in Figure 1.20 The practical syllogism in-
volves a normative statement of what is desirable in the first premise, the
positing of factual conditions in the second premise, and a prescription for
action in the conclusion.21 Thus, the practical syllogism is a form of reason-
ing that builds on the interplay of the desirability of one premise and the
empirical truth of a second premise. If both premises are accepted, it fol-
lows that the conclusion is logically valid (i.e., it is a practical truth).
17. See, e.g., NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE (1999);
Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas J. Donaldson, Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global Bribery
Viewed Through the Lens of Integrative Social Contract Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
BUSINESS ETHICS 61, 61–67 (Norman E. Bowie ed., 2001); PETER ULRICH, INTEGRATIVE ECO-
NOMIC ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS OF A CIVILIZED MARKET ECONOMY (1st ed. 2008) (illustrating ex-
amples of diverse ethical theories).
18. See generally Blake E. Ashforth, Dennis A. Gioia, Sandra L. Robinson & Linda K. Tre-
vin˜o, Introduction to Special Topic Forum: Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption, 33 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 670, 670–84 (2008).
19. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Cor-
porate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 968–75 (2002).
See also Accounting Scandals: The Dozy Watchdogs, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 13, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21635978-some-13-years-after-enron-auditors-still-cant-stop-
managers-cooking-books-time-some.
20. Schreck, van Aaken & Donaldson, supra note 11, at 299–319.
21. See Mary Mothersill, Anscombe’s Account of the Practical Syllogism, 71 DUKE U. PRESS
for PHIL. REV. 448, 453–56 (1962).
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FIGURE 1
In reverse, it can follow that true statements on the implementation
level presuppose both an ex ante normative justification (e.g., “corruption is
morally wrong”) and knowledge of viable ways to implement it (e.g., “cor-
ruption is best combated via collective self-commitments”). In terms of a
metaphor: effective therapy requires an appropriate diagnosis.22 The intent
to provide an appropriate diagnosis in business ethics corresponds to the
goal of explanation (level two).
Because of its position relative to the goal of implementation, the de-
scriptive goal of explanation can be considered a means towards the ends of
normative business ethics. “Explanation for the sake of implementation” is
the short formula for this means-end relation, as proposed by business
ethicist Karl Homann.23 With respect to the relation between descriptive
and normative behavioral research, we can conclude that statements on how
people should behave, necessarily presuppose—without being restricted
to—knowledge on how people actually behave and why they do so.24
In summary, descriptions and explanations of immoral behavior are
relevant to any concept of business ethics that goes beyond the goal of
justification and also pursues the goal of implementation. This is exactly
where experimental research can serve the purposes of normative business
ethics. Before analyzing the potential contribution of experimental econom-
ics, I would first like to shortly characterize the discipline and then discuss
22. See ANDREAS SUCHANEK, ¨OKONOMISCHE ETHIK 23–27 (2d ed. 2007).
23. KARL HOMANN & ANDREAS SUCHANEK, ¨OKONOMIK: EINE EINFUHRUNG 25 (2d ed. 2005)
(stating that the German formulation is “Erkla¨run zwecks Gestaltung”).
24. OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY 32 (1991) (“Make sure when con-
structing a moral theory of projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and
behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us.”).
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two alternative ways in which economics has methodologically dealt with
the phenomenon of morality.25
B. Experimental Economics and the Methodological Status of Morality
1. The Specifics of Experimental Economics
Let’s begin with a short specification of the characteristics of experi-
mental economics and how it may be distinguished from related, though
different, experimental research areas. There are two strategies for defining
experimental economics: either via its specific object or specific method.
One proponent of the first strategy is George Loewenstein, who sug-
gests characterizing experimental economics via its specific object of re-
search. He defines the discipline as “the use of experimentation to address
economic questions.”26 However, considering economic questions is hardly
a unique feature of economics, as psychologists and philosophers also ex-
amine such questions, even though in different ways. Of course, one could
additionally restrict experimental economics to the research conducted by
economists, following the conviction that “economics is what economists
do.”27 However, economists often conduct research that obviously deals
with more than economic questions. For example, Dan Ariely and George
Loewenstein (both experimental economists) published a paper in which
they examine the influence of sexual arousal on perceived attractiveness of
certain sexual stimuli and activities.28
Alternatively, the specific research method may serve as the criterion
to distinguish between experimental economics and other disciplines. The
remainder of this article will follow this approach as specified by Croson in
2005, who identified the following methodological dimensions along which
experimental economics differs (e.g., from experimental psychology):
• Incentives: Participants in economic experiments make their deci-
sions in the presence of incentives (mostly in the form of monetary
payoffs);
• Context: In contrast to psychology experiments, participants’ deci-
sions are not framed in specific contexts;
• Subject Pools: Experimental researchers recruit their participants
from a common pool of volunteers, rather than from their student
classes (which is common practice in psychology); and
25. Again, morality is understood as the sum of ethically-justified and commonly accepted
values, norms, and principles.
26. George Loewenstein, Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural
Economics, 109 ECON. J. F25, F25 (1999) (emphasis added).
27. KENNETH E. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS VOLUME I: MICROECONOMICS 3 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The Effect of
Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 87, 87–98 (2006);
see also Thomas Buser, The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle and Hormone Contraceptives on
Competitiveness, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 1, 1–10 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 8 11-FEB-16 15:18
2016] ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 367
• Deception: In economic experimental laboratories, researchers may
not deceive their participants.29
Back to the question of interest: How does experimental economics
interpret the phenomenon of morality? To begin with, results from eco-
nomic laboratory experiments suggest that human beings do not only maxi-
mize their private payoffs. By and large, they also consider commonly
accepted norms when making decisions in typical economic games:30
• In the so-called prisoner’s dilemma game,31 the standard economic
prediction is that both players will try to maximize payoffs and de-
fect, resulting in a Pareto-inferior solution. In experiments, however,
players realize comparably high levels of cooperation.32
• In so-called ultimatum, dictator, and gift-exchange games, the stan-
dard economic prediction is that the (seemingly) more powerful
player will exploit the other player in order to maximize payoffs.
Again, participants in experiments happen to offer (and reject) much
higher shares than predicted.
• In experiments on honesty and lying, the standard economic predic-
tion is that participants will only be honest as long as lying will not
increase payoffs. In contrast, participants in experiments do not
nearly lie as much as possible.33
There seems to be a broad consensus in economics that (some) human
beings do act morally even in the absence of economic incentives. Why
they do so, however, is far less clear. Two fundamentally different method-
ological strategies have emerged to address this question within experimen-
tal economics: one treats morality as an endogenous factor, the other as an
exogenous factor.34
29. Rachel Croson, The Method of Experimental Economics, 10 INT’L NEGOTIATION 131,
133–40 (2005) (mentioning two additional criteria: “experimental procedures” and “data
analysis”).
30. To some, this result may seem trivial. However, given the assumptions and predictions of
the standard homo oeconomicus model, it is not.
31. Hartmut Kliemt, ¨Okonomische Analyse der Moral, in OKONOMISCHE VERHALTENSTHE-
ORIE 281, 281–310 (Bernd-Thomas Ramb, Manfred Tietzel & Hans-Karl Hartwig eds., 1993).
32. See James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Evidence from
Laboratory Experiments, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 73, 81–91 (2008); see also Ernst Fehr & Klaus M.
Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity—Evidence and Economic Application, in 1 AD-
VANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, EIGHTH WORLD CON-
GRESS 208, 208–58 (Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen & Stephen J. Turnovsky eds., 2003).
33. See generally DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO
EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES (2013); Urs Fischbacher & Franziska Fo¨llmi-Heusi, Lies in
Disguise—An Experimental Study on Cheating, 11 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 525, 532–45
(2013); Uri Gneezy, Bettina Rockenbach & Marta Serra-Garcia, Measuring Lying Aversion, 93 J.
ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 293, 295–99 (2013).
34. See Francesco Guala, Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments Do
(and Do Not) Demonstrate, 35 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 1, 1 (2012) (stating that economists distinguish
between “weak” and “strong” reciprocity that explains “the evolution of human society”).
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2. Chicago Man’s Useful Morality
Proponents of the first strategy argue in line with Gary Becker’s Eco-
nomic Approach35 when they try to explain the emergence of moral behav-
ior without abandoning the assumptions of the amoral36 homo oeconomicus
model. As an allusion to the role of the Chicago school of economics in
establishing and defending this analytical behavioral model, McFadden
calls it the “Chicago Man” model.37
Approaches of this first kind assume that even for a Chicago Man with
no ex ante morality, it may be rational to behave seemingly morally and
thus to cooperate, share payoffs, and tell the truth. Such an approach is
rooted in those works of philosophy and economics that interpret morality
as a useful human institution. According to David Gauthier, for example,38
human beings commit themselves to moral standards because this self-com-
mitment allows for useful cooperation with other market participants:
“[R]ational constraints on the pursuit of interest have themselves a founda-
tion in the interest they constrain. Duty overrides advantage, but the accept-
ance of duty is truly advantageous.”39 Thus, it is no contradiction to the
Chicago Man version of experimental economics if participants in labora-
tory experiments behave in a way that does not “pay off” in the short run.
Participants do bring cooperative preferences into the lab, which An-
dreoni and Miller refer to as “homemade altruism.”40 But they do so for
strategic reasons: what looks like moral behavior is a rational strategy.41 In
essence, this perspective is the continuation of Milton Friedman’s “as if”
35. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3, 3–14 (1976);
see also Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 385, 385–409 (1993).
36. Note the difference between “immoral” (against morals) and “amoral” (without morals).
37. Daniel McFadden, Rationality for Economists?, 19 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 73, 76 (1999).
38. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); KARL SIGMUND, THE CALCULUS OF SELFISHNESS (2010) (exploring
“the reciprocity between self-interested individuals”).
39. DAVID P. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 2 (1986).
40. James Andreoni & John H. Miller, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, 103 ECON. J. 570, 571 (1993). See also Colin Camerer
& Keith Weigelt, Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model, 56
ECONOMETRICA 1, 11 (1988) (stating that potential cooperation partners form their expectations on
homemade altruism).
41. See generally James Andreoni & Larry Samuelson, Building Rational Cooperation, 127
J. ECON. THEORY 117, 118 (2006); Robert Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
24 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4 (1980); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Ego-
ists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306, 306 (1981); Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page & Karl Sigmund,
Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCI. 1774, 1774–75 (2000); COOPERATION
AND ITS EVOLUTION (Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser eds., 2013) (indi-
cating that experimental economists of the Chicago Man version share this perspective with those
natural scientists that interpret the evolution of cooperation from an evolutionary biology
perspective).
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methodology,42 which served as a legitimization of the unrealistic homo
oeconomicus model: human beings behave as if morality plays a role be-
yond the logic of monetary self-interest.
To summarize, the Chicago Man version of experimental economics
treats morality as an endogenous factor. In consequence, it seeks to explain
the emergence of morality by asking how it may prove to be a useful human
institution.
3. Morality as an Exogenous Preference and an End in Itself
Proponents of a second, paradigmatically different strategy cast doubt
on the adequacy of the standard homo oeconomicus model for a consistent
explanation of human behavior: “Clearly there’s a lot more going on here
than Becker and standard economics would have us believe.”43 Their main
argument is that there is overwhelming empirical evidence for the existence
of non-strategic morality and that economics should adjust its standard
model’s assumptions in order to increase its descriptive and prognostic va-
lidity. The subsequent integration of various psychological factors into eco-
nomic behavioral models has also led to explicit considerations of an
exogenous preference for norm-abiding behavior.
These developments within experimental economics are closely related
to the field of behavioral economics and its efforts to incorporate social
preferences in formal analytical models.44 Based on the limited capability
of the standard homo oeconomicus model to explain actual behavior, behav-
ioral economists argue that economic models ought to be extended:
“[E]vidence indicates that a substantial percentage of the people are
strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and that concerns for the
well-being of others, for fairness and for reciprocity, cannot be ignored in
social interactions.”45
42. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECO-
NOMICS 3, 3–16, 30–43 (1966).
43. ARIELY, supra note 33, at 26.
44. See, e.g., Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and
Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166, 166–88 (2000); Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Under-
standing Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. ECON. 817, 822–25 (2002); Ernst Fehr &
Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817,
817–68 (1999). Compare DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2009), with John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore & Larry Samuelson, Learn-
ing to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game, 8 GAMES ECON. BEHAV. 56, 65 (1995), and Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Ethics, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
1449, 1459 (2003), and Alvin E. Roth & Ido Erev, Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experi-
mental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term, 8 GAMES ECON. BEHAV. 164,
171–77 (1995).
45. Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism –
Experimental Evidence and New Theories, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, AL-
TRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 615, 617 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006).
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To summarize, the psychological version of experimental economics
treats morality as a dispositional preference. When individuals act in line
with such dispositions, they experience gains in utility; their violation, in
contrast, causes costs. Morality is thus interpreted as an exogenous factor,
which should be integrated in formal behavioral models to increase their
ability to explain and predict human behavior.
The distinction between these two generic methodological strategies
can now be used to address the question of what normative business ethics
has to learn from them. Using experimental literature on honesty and on
cooperation as an example, the following two chapters will exemplify
where exactly normative business ethics can use the findings from the two
versions of experimental economics.
III. MORALITY WITHIN THE “PSYCHOLOGICAL” VERSION
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
A. Interpretation as a Problem of Will
If behavior is the result of individual dispositions, there can only be
one interpretation of immoral behavior: it is a function of weak or corrupted
preferences. Expressed within the categories of ethics, the origin of im-
moral behavior is a “lack of character.”46
Experiments have consistently shown that different participants lie to
varying degrees even when exposed to identical situations. Some are notori-
ous liars, while others tell the truth in every single period of the experi-
ment—although this means that they deny themselves higher payoffs.47
Some “psychological” experimental economists have used this observation
to wonder where this lack of character may stem from. Their search for
potential explanations has drawn their attention to the behavior of two
populations that proved suspicious on first sight: students of economics and
professors of ethics.
Several experiments have analyzed whether economics students are
more prone to uncooperative behavior than their fellow students from other
disciplines. Early studies from Marwell and Ames, for example, found that
economists behave comparably egoistically in public goods games: “Eco-
nomics graduate students . . . were much more likely to free ride than any of
our other groups of subjects.”48 This result was supported by subsequent
studies that claimed that economics students behave less cooperatively in
ultimatum games;49 that they defect more often in prisoner’s dilemma
46. JOHN DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR (Cambridge
Univ. Press et al. eds., 2002).
47. See Gneezy et al., supra note 33, at 299.
48. Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experi-
ments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 306–07 (1981).
49. See John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 171, 177 (1991).
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games;50 and, finally, that economics students (especially male ones!) are
more corrupt than others.51 Typically, such results are explained with refer-
ence to selection effects on the one side and learning or “indoctrination”52
effects on the other. While the first states that a certain type of student self-
selects into economics and business studies, the second expects that the
specific design and contents of these study programs change their students’
character. With their findings, such studies lend support for the hypothesis
that economics—and particularly MBA programs—undermine their stu-
dents’ morality.53
Not surprisingly, experimental researchers have also reported contra-
dicting evidence. Based on the results of their experimental research, they
argue that no differences exist between students of different subjects.54 But
whoever may be right in this debate, the explanation for observed behavior
remains the same: it is the character of economics students that (for
whatever reasons) is corrupted and is thus responsible for their behavior.
The character of ethics professors, by the way, seems not to be morally
superior to that of other professors. As empirical studies—though not con-
ducted in the lab—suggest, ethics professors steal books more often and
pay conference fees as (un)reliably as their peers from other disciplines.55
As these examples demonstrate, one kind of study in experimental eco-
nomics analyzes the relationship between individual personality characteris-
tics and behavior. They ask questions such as: Are creative people more
prone to dishonesty?56 Are men more cooperative than women,57 English-
50. See Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, Does Studying Economics
Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 164 (1993).
51. See Bjo¨rn Frank & Gu¨nther G. Schulze, Does Economics Make Citizens Corrupt?, 43 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 101, 110 (2000).
52. See Yoram Bauman & Elaina Rose, Selection or Indoctrination: Why Do Economics
Students Donate Less Than the Rest?, 79 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 318, 318 (2011).
53. See Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management
Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75 (2005); see also Matthias Philip Hu¨hn, You
Reap What You Sow: How MBA Programs Undermine Ethics, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 527 (2014).
54. See David N. Laband & Richard O. Beil, Are Economists More Selfish than Other ‘So-
cial’ Scientists?, 100 PUB. CHOICE 85 (1999); see also Anthony M. Yezer, Robert S. Goldfarb &
Paul J. Poppen, Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not
What We Say or How We Play, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 177 (1996).
55. See Eric Schwitzgebel, Do Ethicists Steal More Books?, 22 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 711 (2009);
see also Eric Schwitzgebel, Are Ethicists Any More Likely to Pay Their Registration Fees at
Professional Meetings?, 29 ECON. & PHIL. 371 (2013); Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust, The
Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships Among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed
Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior, 27 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 293 (2014).
56. Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of Creativity: Original Thinkers Can Be
More Dishonest, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 445, 445 (2012).
57. James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Evidence from Labo-
ratory Experiments, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 73 (2008).
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men more than Italians,58 Germans from the East more than those from the
West?59
B. Interpretation as a Problem of Ability
Besides the attribution of immoral behavior to an individual’s (lack of)
character, there is another mode of explanation available to the psychologi-
cal version of experimental economics. It may assume that an ex ante inten-
tion for moral behavior exists, but that certain situational (contextual) forces
can partially or even entirely crowd out this intention. This way, the expla-
nation of immoral behavior moves from a problem of will to a problem of
ability: If a person has the intention to act morally, will he be able to act
accordingly?
Presenting the concept of bounded morality, Donaldson and Dunfee
state that this is not always the case: “[M]oral rationality in economic con-
texts is strongly bounded.”60 The concept’s basic idea is that even if human
beings had internalized the world’s knowledge on ethics and wanted to act
morally, various cognitive and situational constraints would restrict their
ability to act accordingly.61
In this vein, Kern and Chugh investigated experimentally whether in-
dividuals are limited in their moral decisions by cognitive constraints that
they are not aware of and thus cannot directly influence. The underlying
hypothesis is that human beings come to different evaluations of identical
facts once they are presented in different ways. Following the basic argu-
ments of Kahnemann and Tversky,62 the authors hypothesize that individu-
als are more likely to engage in immoral behavior when their behavior’s
result is framed in terms of losses (“loss frame”) rather than in terms of
gains (“gain frame”): “[I]ndividuals who perceive a potential outcome as a
loss will go to greater lengths, and engage in more unethical behavior, to
avert that loss than will individuals who perceive a similarly sized gain.”63
In accordance with their hypotheses, a negotiation game with MBA stu-
dents showed that negotiating parties were more likely to lie when the ne-
58. Roberto Burlando & John D. Hey, Do Anglo-Saxons Free-Ride More?, 64 J. PUB. ECON.
41 (1997).
59. Axel Ockenfels & Joachim Weimann, Types and Patterns: An Experimental East-West-
German Comparison of Cooperation and Solidarity, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 275 (1999).
60. Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 10, at 256.
61. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 19–22 (Princeton Univ. Press 2011); see also Don-
aldson & Dunfee, supra note 10.
62. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
63. Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss Framing, 20
PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 379 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-FEB-16 15:18
2016] ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 373
gotiation outcome was framed as a risk of loss rather than as an opportunity
of gain.
The notion of self-concept maintenance provides a second example of
how the psychological version of experimental economics explains a poten-
tial discrepancy between moral intentions and immoral behavior.64 This
concept assumes that human beings have a strong preference for honesty
but are willing to reap the benefits that may arise from lying—as long as
their behavior still allows them to maintain their self-image as an honest
person. This equilibrium may be disturbed, however, when honesty is ex-
posed to corrosive factors.
To analyze these factors’ strength, Dan Ariely and his colleagues con-
ducted dozens of experiments to observe the conditions under which par-
ticipants are willing to overstate their scores in a math task just to increase
their earnings in an experiment. To this end, some of the participants were
allowed to report their performance score (on which income was based) to
the experimenter after they had shredded their test sheets. This experimental
design allows for a comparison of lying and honesty on the treatment group
level, but not on an individual level. Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi pro-
posed a structurally similar design: participants in an experiment roll dice
and are remunerated according to the reported roll of the dice—but their
report is strictly anonymous.65
This stream of research has produced several interesting findings, such
as:
• The intensity of financial incentives, as provided in tournaments, in-
creases lying;66
• Individuals lie more often when these lies also imply benefits for
others and when responsibility for the lie can be shared;67
• Having lied once lowers the inhibition threshold for additional lies;68
• Low sympathy for the person being lied at, or bad experiences from
earlier interactions decrease levels of honesty;69 and
• Participants who are depleted are more likely to cheat than those
who are not.
Based on the latter results, Ariely was also able to explain why, con-
spicuously, his students’ grandmothers are most likely to “die” during exam
64. See generally Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A
Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008).
65. See Fischbacher & Fo¨llmi-Heusi, supra note 33.
66. See Julian Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch, Rainer Michael Rilke, Anne Schielke & Gari
Walkowitz, Honesty in Tournaments, 123 ECON. LETTERS 90 (2014).
67. See Julian Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch, Rainer Michael Rilke & Gari Walkowitz, Lying
and Team Incentives, 34 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1 (2013).
68. See ARIELY, supra note 33, at 127.
69. See Daniel Houser, Stefan Vetter & Joachim Winter, Fairness and Cheating, 56 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1645 (2012).
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weeks, when depleted students ask for a retake exam in order to be able to
attend their grandmothers’ funerals.70
C. Implications
In conclusion, the psychological version of experimental economics
provides the following diagnosis: if individuals do not behave in accor-
dance with socially accepted norms, this is due to an (ex ante) weak charac-
ter or corrupting forces that weaken the character. Knowing about a
character’s weaknesses or those forces corrupting it allows for an improve-
ment of the situation: “[R]ecognizing our shortcomings is a crucial first step
on the path to making better decisions, creating better societies, and fixing
our institutions.”71 Based on this particular diagnosis, it follows that, from
the perspective of normative business ethics (and the goal of implementa-
tion), prescriptions should focus on two aspects: strengthening the character
and remediating corrupting influences.
With respect to the first aspect—strengthening character—experimen-
tal studies have demonstrated that increasing the salience of commonly ac-
cepted moral norms can make people behave ethically. Resetting people’s
“moral compass”72 could, for instance, be achieved when an experiment’s
participants hear the Ten Commandments right before making a decision;73
or when taxpayers testify their honest intent by signing their tax return
before, rather than after, providing self-reported information.74
With respect to the second aspect—remediating corrupting forces—the
better one knows the contextual obstacles on the way to ethical judgment or
ethical behavior, the better these can be eliminated.75 Once Ulysses under-
stands that he will not be able to resist the temptation of the sirens, he has
his men tie him to a mast.76 And if a person knows he tends to apply mis-
leading moral heuristics under time pressure, he should make sure there is
enough time when he ought to make important, ethically relevant
decisions.77
The analysis to this point leads to the following preliminary conclu-
sion: without committing the naturalistic fallacy, the psychological version
of experimental economics as a positive discipline can provide guidance to
70. See ARIELY, supra note 33, at 106–08.
71. Id. at 247.
72. Id. at 249–50.
73. Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008).
74. Lisa L. Shu, Nina Mazar, Francesca Gino, Dan Ariely & Max H. Bazerman, Signing at
the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to Sign-
ing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 15197 (2012).
75. APPIAH, supra note 8, at 49.
76. ELSTER, supra note 38.
77. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (John M. Olin Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
180, 2003), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/180.crs_.moral_.pdf.
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the normative discipline of business ethics. The same holds true for the
Chicago Man version of experimental economics, as the following discus-
sion will demonstrate.
IV. MORALITY WITHIN THE CHICAGO MAN VERSION
OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
A. The Question Asked by Normative Institutional Ethics
As we saw earlier, the Chicago Man version of experimental econom-
ics interprets morality as a useful institution of self-interested agents. As a
methodological consequence, it looks for the underlying incentives that
cause, or at least allow for, ethical behavior.
In moral philosophy, this perspective corresponds to that of institu-
tional ethics (i.e., those ethical theories that, when developing normative
implications, are less directed to individuals but rather to the institutions
within which individuals perform their actions). One such approach is that
of German philosopher and economist Karl Homann, who—in the tradition
of institutional economics—distinguishes institutions from the behavior
within them. Most importantly, Homann posits that changes in behavior
presuppose changes in institutions, rather than in character.78
What is of particular relevance for this paper is that institutional ethics
demands that individuals and organizations themselves engage in ethical
improvements of the institutions in which they operate. This normative pos-
tulation is reflected in what Andreas Suchanek calls the “Golden Rule” of
institutional ethics: “You ought to invest into the foundations of social co-
operation for the sake of mutual advantage.”79 This imperative of institu-
tional ethics reflects a fundamental normative assumption. It assumes that
for every moral problem on the level of behavior, there is a possibility to
implement change on the level of institutions that can solve the moral prob-
lem to everybody’s advantage. Hence, it will be in the self-interest of indi-
viduals and organizations to identify and push for such institutional change.
In search of opportunities for institutional change, normative business eth-
ics can resort to the many interesting insights the Chicago Man version of
experimental economics has to offer. Using the literature on punishment
78. “Bedingungswandel statt Gesinnungswandel” is an often-cited German quote reflecting
this principle. KARL HOMANN, Die Bedeutung von Dilemmastrukturen fu¨r die Ethik, in VORTEILE
UND ANREIZE 94, 100 (Christoph Lu¨tge ed., 2002). For the latest comprehensive description of
Homann’s theory, see KARL HOMANN, SOLLEN UND K ¨ONNEN: GRENZEN UND BEDINGUNGEN DER
INDIVIDUALMORAL (2014). Unfortunately, no comprehensive English description exists to date.
79. ANDREAS SUCHANEK, ¨OKONOMISCHE ETHIK 5 (2001). Similar postulations—though with
varying justifications—are shared by those recent concepts of business ethics that attribute a polit-
ical co-responsibility of business. Cf. Ingo Pies, Stefan Hielscher & Markus Beckmann, Moral
Commitments and the Societal Role of Business: An Ordonomic Approach to Corporate Citizen-
ship, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 375 (2009); Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, The New Political
Role of Business in a Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implica-
tions for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 899 (2011).
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and cooperation as an example, the following section will illustrate this
claim.80
B. The Answer Provided by Experimental Economics
Throughout the last fifteen years, a voluminous body of research has
evolved around the question whether cooperation in dilemma situations
may be sustained through granting participants the option to mutually re-
ward and/or punish each other.81 The typical structure of the interaction is
such that on the one hand, the group would be better off if all of its mem-
bers complied with the social norm of cooperation. On the other hand, each
group member has strong incentives to deviate from that norm. Such a
structure of interaction is typical for the prisoner’s dilemma or public goods
games. If, however, an option exists to punish norm-violating behavior, this
option may be costly for the punisher but yields even higher benefits if it
disciplines other group members into compliance with the norm. From the
perspective of institutional ethics, two streams within this literature are of
particular relevance.
First, a wide range of experimental studies compare different exoge-
nous institutional arrangements by their capability to enforce socially ac-
cepted norms such as cooperation. In these experiments, participants have
to accept incentives at the institutional level as they are, but they have the
possibility to make decisions on the level of individual actions. For exam-
ple, Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund used different variants of a pro-
poser-responder game82 to analyze how punishments and rewards can
stabilize cooperation among the players.83 Based on the results of their ex-
perimental study, the authors determined that participants discipline each
other most and achieve the highest levels of cooperation and social welfare
when they have the option to reward or to punish their peers.84 Similarly,
80. The literature offers analyses of many other institutions capable of sustaining coopera-
tion. See generally DAVID M. KREPS, PAUL MILGROM, JOHN ROBERTS & ROBERT WILSON, RA-
TIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY-REPEATED PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (Ctr. for Research on
Organizational Efficiency Stanford University 1982). See, e.g., James Andreoni & John H. Miller,
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, 103
ECON. J. 570 (1993) (explaining why participants in prisoner’s dilemma games tend to maintain
high levels of cooperation in early periods). Cooperation is interpreted as an investment in individ-
ual reputation, which helps signal trustworthiness towards potential cooperation partners. Other
examples of mechanisms that affect levels of cooperation include communication, the degree of
anonymity, and the temporal structure of the interaction.
81. See, e.g., Ananish Chaudhuri, Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Ex-
periments: A Selective Survey of the Literature, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 47 (2010); Guala, supra
note 34.
82. In this class of two-person economic games, one participant proposes a certain distribu-
tion of income among the two players, and the other participant responds to the offer with varying
effects.
83. James Andreoni, William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, The Carrot or the Stick: Re-
wards, Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 893, 893–902 (2003).
84. Id.
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Ga¨chter, Renner, and Sefton concluded from their public goods experiments
that punishment options in long-term interactions lead to more cooperation
and higher profits.85 And Casari and Luini showed that punishment options
are particularly useful in fostering cooperation when supported by the ma-
jority of a group.86 Such works provide important insights into the condi-
tions under which mutual punishment may function as a norm-enforcing
institution.
Second—and arguably most relevant to the aims of institutional eth-
ics—another strand of experimental research examines under which condi-
tions members of a group are willing to invest and engage in (endogenous)
institution building. In these experiments, participants can exert influence
on both the action and the institutional levels. This literature is extraordina-
rily important because it allows for conclusions as to whether participants
of experiments actually interpret the issue of immoral behavior at the action
level as a “problem of ability”; and whether they themselves are able to
establish the institutional arrangements that allow for moral behavior.
For example, consider the experiment of Andreoni and Gee, who ex-
plored the influence of two alternative endogenous control institutions on
levels of cooperation in a public goods game.87 In the case of peer-to-peer
punishment, participants make their choices on how much to contribute to
the public good.88 In addition, they can penalize each other for uncoopera-
tive behavior (action level).89 Alternatively, they can also centralize the
right to punish and delegate it to an independent policing mechanism,
which corresponds to a choice on the level of institutions.90 In the latter
case, the player with the lowest contribution to the public good automati-
cally receives a penalty, making it optimal for each player to provide the
second-lowest contribution. Collectively, each player’s intention to contrib-
ute more than the lowest contribution causes an upward spiral, ultimately
leading to comparably high contributions in the groups that choose the dele-
gated punishment system. In the experiment, 85 percent of all participants
did invest into this mechanism, which allowed them to achieve significantly
higher group welfare than the remaining 15 percent.91
85. Simon Ga¨chter, Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment,
322 SCIENCE 1510 (2008).
86. Marco Casari & Luigi Luini, Cooperation under Alternative Punishment Institutions: An
Experiment, 71 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 273, 273–82 (2009).
87. James Andreoni & Laura K. Gee, Gun for Hire: Delegated Enforcement and Peer Pun-
ishment in Public Goods Provision, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1036, 1036–46 (2012).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. GUALA, supra note 34, at 12.
91. In the Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach study, most participants opted for a peer-to-
peer punishment system and realized higher rents from their cooperation. See ¨Ozgu¨r Gu¨rerk,
Bernd Irlenbusch & Bettina Rockenbach, The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions,
312 SCIENCE 108 (2006). Cf. Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran & Kenju Kamei, Public Goods
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Knowing that participants are willing to invest in the establishment of
norm-enforcing institutions also raises the question why they are willing to
do so, because investments in such institutions imply a public goods prob-
lem themselves, albeit one of a second order. A rational individual would
want other participants to bear the costs of the policing mechanism while
benefiting from its establishment. Thus, it is not surprising that recent ex-
perimental studies suggest that group members are only willing and able to
establish centralized punishment systems if “second order free riding” can
be punished as well.92
Such results take us back to the point of departure. If we observe
costly institutional investments where it would be rational to free ride, this
raises the same question as when we observe cooperation where it would be
rational to defect: Does this behavior reflect an ex ante morality, or is it the
result of a “calculus of selfishness”?93 While the studies cited above argue
in favor of the latter argument, other authors argue that the establishment of
costly, norm-enforcing institutions presuppose a minimum share of altruisti-
cally motivated agents.94
C. Implications
Wherever the truth lies, these examples should have demonstrated that
even the Chicago Man version of experimental economics has something to
offer to normative business ethics. It provides knowledge on how institu-
tions may stabilize moral norms and ethical behavior, and this knowledge
bears normative implications.
First, the findings from this strand of experimental economics are most
important from an institutional design perspective. The better business eth-
ics will be informed about the functioning of institutions and their capabil-
ity to guide human behavior, the closer it will come to its goal of
implementing ethical behavior:
To the extent that we are interested in improving the lot of man-
kind it is better to put less emphasis on moral education and on
building character and more emphasis on trying to arrange social
and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1213 (2011) (studying the effects of
centralized institutions).
92. See Arne Traulsen, Torsten Ro¨hl & Manfred Milinski, An Economic Experiment Reveals
that Humans Prefer Pool Punishment to Maintain the Commons, 279 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B.
3716 (2012); Boyu Zhang, Cong Li, Hannelore De Silva, Peter Bednarik & Karl Sigmund, The
Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions: An Experimental Approach to the Social Contract, 17 EX-
PERIMENTAL ECON. 285 (2014).
93. E.g., SIGMUND, supra note 38.
94. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Ga¨chter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137,
137–40 (2002); Matthias Sutter, Stefan Haigner & Martin G. Kocher, Choosing the Carrot or the
Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 1540
(2010); see also GUALA, supra note 34, at 5 (arguing that “[u]nder this interpretation, punishment
mechanisms are useful methodological devices to observe social preferences”).
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institutions so that human beings are not placed in situations in
which they will act badly.95
Second, these findings are useful in clarifying under which conditions
actors may reasonably be expected to partake in the establishment of insti-
tutions. The better business ethics will be informed about the emergence
and establishment of norm-enforcing institutions, the more guidance it can
offer its addressees for the solution of moral problems—and the more it can
demand from them to actively contribute to such solutions.
In conclusion, normative business ethics has a lot to learn from experi-
mental economics. This holds true for both the psychological version and,
though more surprisingly, the Chicago Man version. Interestingly, the be-
havioral business ethics literature hardly refers to the findings of the Chi-
cago Man version of experimental economics. This selective reception of
the literature may be owed to the field’s proximity to the discipline of psy-
chology, but it is an omission to the disadvantage of behavioral business
ethics. Because, as I hope to have shown, it is exactly the part of economics
that does not presuppose the existence of an ex ante morality that could be
most useful to normative business ethics and its goal to implement morality.
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
Against the background of an alleged antagonism between normative
business ethics and experimental behavioral research, this article started out
by asking whether the former discipline has anything to learn from the lat-
ter. The analysis started out with the distinction of three different epistemo-
logical goals of business ethics: justification, explanation, and
implementation. While I argued that positive research, such as experimental
behavioral research, has very little to offer with respect to the goal of justi-
fication, I used the example of experimental economics to demonstrate how
the explanations and predictions of this positive discipline may instrumen-
tally serve the normative purpose of implementation.
The subsequent discussion distinguished two versions of experimental
economics, each yielding interesting findings for the purposes of business
ethics. On the one hand, the “psychological” version treats morality as an
exogenous factor when interpreting it as a preference, which agents con-
sider as an end in itself. This line of research offers important insights into
whether individuals are willing, and when they are actually able, to act in
accordance with their moral intentions.
On the other hand, the traditional Chicago Man version treats morality
as an endogenous factor when interpreting it as the useful institution of
selfish actors. Here, the focus is less on the individual and more on the
institutions that allow for moral behavior. Importantly, recent research has
95. Gilbert Harman, My Virtue Situation (Dec. 4, 2005), http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/
Papers/Situ.pdf.
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critically examined such institutions’ capability to bring about moral behav-
ior where, in absence of such institutions, norm violation is prevalent. And
it has shed light on the conditions under which individuals are willing to
collectively establish such institutions. These findings could be most in-
formative with respect to the primary purpose of institutional ethics: to
identify institutional arrangements designed to align individual self-inter-
ested rationality with the ethically desirable outcome.
One question that has remained unanswered is which of the two
sketched methodological strategies behavioral business ethics should even-
tually follow. One could argue that it does not matter because the choice of
strategy is a matter of time horizon. Maybe the intention to adhere to social
norms has a self-interested foundation, as evolutionary arguments from
economists, anthropologists, and psychologists suggest.96 So from a long-
term, evolutionary perspective, ethicists may wonder where moral disposi-
tions come from and thus interpret them as an endogenous factor. But in a
given situation, the consideration of such norms may not be contingent
upon an agent’s short-term advantage. That is why in experiments we often
observe moral behavior even though it does not pay off. So, from a short-
term perspective, morality will be exogenous in any case. And especially
when the analysis focuses on the conditions under which individuals are
(not) able to act in line with their moral intentions (“the problem of abil-
ity”), both theoretical perspectives converge.
In contrast, one could argue that the choice of methodological perspec-
tive does matter as it affects which will be the focal research questions. If it
is assumed that moral behavior is rooted in self-interest, then the seemingly
exogenous morality (remember the notion of “homemade altruism”) will
only be sustained if continuously supported by appropriate institutions. That
is, institutions warranting that moral behavior will not permanently stand in
contradiction with one’s self-interest. Hence, the adoption of a Chicago
Man methodology will direct the researcher’s focus to exactly these institu-
tions, rather than to the individual’s dispositions as the psychological per-
spective would do.
To be sure, from a normative ethics perspective, the focus on institu-
tions does not mean that individual ethics would cease to be relevant.
Human beings do not only follow rules, they can also influence them. This
option implies an increased responsibility on the level of institutions, even
when individuals are partially unburdened from responsibilities on the level
of action. So even if ethics is considered a primarily institutional matter, the
evaluation of an institution’s ethical quality presupposes the capability of
ethical judgment. This judgment remains the responsibility of individuals.
96. APPIAH, supra note 8, at 126–45 (discussing some of these arguments).
